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Abstract 
This paper investigates whether the mandatory IFRS adoption has affected the 
informativeness of analyst recommendation revisions in Europe. Although prior studies 
document that IFRS adoption improved analyst forecast attributes, the impact of IFRS 
can’t be completely assessed without examining how the market reacts to information-
rich events in an environment with enhanced disclosure. To examine this question we 
utilize a difference-in-differences design using as main control sample firms that had 
voluntarily adopted IFRS before the EU’s mandated switch. Overall, our evidence 
suggests that after the mandatory adoption of IFRS both analyst upgrades and 
downgrades are more informative. These results hold after controlling for a number of 
variables that capture analyst, firm and information environment characteristics and are 
robust to a number of sensitivity analyses including the use of a US control sample. 
Finally, we examine whether our results are sensitive to the level of accounting 
enforcement. We find that analyst downgrades are more informative in the post-IFRS 
period for firms in both high and low enforcement environments. Analyst upgrades, 
however, are more informative only if they are issued for firms in high enforcement 
countries.  
Keywords: IFRS, recommendations, enforcement, financial analysts, informativeness  
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1. Introduction 
The 2005 mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
aimed to enhance the comparability of financial statements, improve corporate disclosure, 
and increase the quality of financial reporting (Regulation (EC) No. 1606/2002). In their 
2002 joint white paper, KPMG International and Goldman Sachs asserted that the impact 
of IFRS adoption in Europe would enhance transparency by requiring companies to 
disclose new and different aspects of their businesses. This expectation is also reflected in 
a study conducted by KPMG in 2005 which showed that nearly 77% of financial analysts 
surveyed believed that the introduction of IFRS would have an impact on company 
valuation. Whether this enhanced transparency will also increase the informativeness of 
analyst stock recommendations is, however, not a priori clear. Even though the literature 
shows that analyst earnings forecasts exhibit more accuracy after the mandated IFRS 
adoption, this result may be more related to IFRS earnings exhibiting greater persistence 
and predictability, than providing value relevant information. Ultimately, how investors 
react to the release of analyst recommendation revisions in the post-IFRS period depends 
on whether analysts rely on IFRS financial statements to release more informative 
recommendations. However, evidence suggests that analysts rely more on their private 
communication with firm management than on the financial statements themselves as an 
input to their stock recommendations (Brown, Call, Clement and Sharp, 2015), in turn 
suggesting that IFRS may not be that useful to analyst research. Thus, whether the 
informativeness of analyst stock recommendation revisions has been affected by the 
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mandatory adoption of IFRS is still an open question and an important one to answer in 
order to more comprehensibly assess the impact of the mandatory IFRS adoption in 
Europe.  
Our main dataset consists of 9,992 recommendation revisions for EU firms that 
mandatorily switched to IFRS with 5,408 (4,584) revisions issued in the pre- (post-) IFRS 
period. To mitigate concerns that our results are affected by events other than those 
associated with the mandated IFRS switch (Hail and Leuz, 2007), our methodological 
design implements a difference-in-differences approach. Specifically, we benchmark the 
analysis, first on a sample of firms that had voluntarily adopted IFRS and second on a 
sample of US firms. Because firms included in the control samples either use IFRS both 
before and after mandatory adoption, or do not use IFRS at all, the informativeness of 
their stock recommendations can only be affected by concurrent economic and regulatory 
changes, enabling us to effectively control for potential confounding events. An 
important concern in related research is whether documented changes in the post IFRS 
period are indeed due to the adoption of IFRS or instead affected by concurrent changes 
in the institutional environment and, more specifically, in the country’s enforcement 
levels (Soderstrom and Sun, 2007; Christensen, Hail, and Leuz, 2013). The use of a 
control sample comprising of voluntary adopters, in particular, helps alleviate such 
concerns since, to the extent that disclosure quality of voluntary adopters is also enhanced 
in the period following the mandated IFRS switch, differences between the two samples 
should be more difficult to document, decreasing, in turn, our ability to find evidence in 
support of our expectations.  
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Our results suggest that the market reaction to recommendation revisions for mandatory 
adopters is stronger in the post-IFRS period. Specifically, the three-day abnormal return 
around the issuance of the revision is more positive for upgrades and more negative for 
downgrades, indicating that the 2005 mandatory adoption of IFRS increased the 
informativeness of analyst stock recommendations. When we condition the analysis on 
the level of accounting enforcement
1
 we find that the increase in informativeness for 
stock upgrades is only observed in strong enforcement environments, consistent with 
related research (see for example, Landsman, Maydew and Thornock, 2012). 
Interestingly, we find that downgrades are more informative in both strong and weak 
enforcement environments but the increase in informativeness is greater when country 
enforcement is strong. We explain these results based on research suggesting that 
managers face incentives to delay or even conceal poor performance (Kothari, Shu and 
Wysocki, 2009; Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki, 2003). The existence of these incentives 
suggests that the disclosure of good news is deemed reliable only when accounting 
standards are rigorously enforced. On the other hand, bad news can be reliable even if 
additional mandated disclosures are loosely applied.  
Our results are robust to an array of sensitivity analyses. For example, we conjecture that 
if indeed the driving force behind the increased informativeness of analyst 
recommendation revisions is related to IFRS, revisions released shortly after earnings 
announcements should be more informative than those released further away. Results are 
consistent with this expectation. We also find that our results are not sensitive to: (a) the 
                                                          
1
 The country enforcement measure used in this study is the auditing and accounting enforcement measure 
in Brown, Preiato and Tarca (2014). For brevity purposes we refer to this measure as accounting 
enforcement.   
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exclusion from the control sample of voluntary adopters from low enforcement 
environments, (b) the exclusion of UK firms, and (c) the use of an alternative measure of 
country legal enforcement based on Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastuzzi (2007).  
Our evidence makes a number of important contributions to the literature. First, we 
contribute to the IFRS literature by examining the effect of the mandatory IFRS switch 
on one of the most important financial research outputs: stock recommendations.
 
The 
literature has shown that analyst stock recommendations elicit significant returns when 
they are released and that their information content is not subsumed by the information 
content of other types of analyst research output.
 
Therefore, whether stock 
recommendation revisions will be more informative can’t be automatically presumed 
from evidence documenting improvements in analyst forecast properties. In addition, and 
unlike studies which examine the IFRS effects on analyst forecast properties, examining 
their effect on the informativeness of analyst recommendations changes the focus of the 
question from the analyst to the investors themselves. Prior research documents that IFRS 
adoption is associated with greater analyst forecast accuracy, (Byard, Li and Yu, 2011; 
Horton, Serafeim and Serafeim, 2013), yet it does not directly follow that the increase in 
analyst accuracy also reflects increased forecast informativeness; it is possible, for 
example, that reported earnings are less volatile under IFRS, increasing, in turn, the 
ability of analysts to forecast future earnings more accurately. Such increase in accuracy, 
therefore, does not necessarily imply an increase in the information content of the 
forecasts.  
Second, our results provide new insights to the results of related research. By showing 
that mandatory IFRS adoption is also associated with more informative analyst research 
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we complement the results of prior research which suggests that IFRS adoption is 
associated with increases in the quality of firm disclosures. These results are of 
paramount importance, given the central role analysts play in capital markets. From the 
standpoint of regulators this result should be of particular importance as the impact of 
IFRS adoption can’t be completely assessed without examining how it affects investor 
behavior.  Our evidence also contributes to the ongoing debate in the accounting 
literature of whether accounting quality is determined by accounting policies themselves 
or rather by the country’s institutional factors (see for example, Ball, Kothari and Robin, 
2000), as it suggests that the sign of the news is important when assessing the relative 
importance of accounting standards in determining accounting quality. Specifically, in 
the presence of bad news, the move to IFRS alone can help improve the information 
environment at least when this is captured by the informativeness of analyst stock 
recommendation revisions. Accounting enforcement on the other hand, plays a significant 
role in safeguarding the quality of information when positive news is conveyed. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses related literature 
and provides a framework for developing the study’s basic expectations. Section 3 
presents the methodology and describes the data, Section 4 discusses the empirical results, 
Section 5 provides sensitivity analysis results and Section 6 concludes.  
2.  Related research, contribution and hypotheses development 
2.1 Related Research and Contribution 
The mandated adoption of IFRS in Europe aimed to increase investor protection as 
evidenced by the following quote from the European Union’s directive 1606/2002: “This 
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Regulation has as its objective the adoption and use of international accounting standards 
in the Community with a view to harmonising the financial information presented by the 
companies referred to in Article 4 in order to ensure a high degree of transparency and 
comparability of financial statements and hence an efficient functioning of the 
Community capital market and of the Internal Market.” Thus, the expected benefits of the 
mandatory adoption in the EU relate to increased disclosure quality and comparability.  
IFRS research has consistently provided evidence in support of this conjecture. The 
benefits of the mandatory switch to IFRS include increases in market liquidity and 
decreases in cost of capital (Daske, Hail, Leuz and Verdi, 2008; Li, 2010), greater 
institutional or foreign investment (Florou and Pope, 2012; DeFond, Hu, Hung and Li, 
2011), and higher information content of earnings (Landsman et al., 2012). Finally, a few 
papers examine whether IFRS adoption affected analyst research by looking at its effects 
on analyst earnings forecasts with most of these documenting improvements in properties 
of analyst earnings forecasts (Byard et al., 2011; Tan, Wang and Welker, 2011; Horton et 
al., 2013). Preiato, Brown and Tarca, (2015), however, fail to find strong evidence that 
the mandatory or voluntary adoption of IFRS improved either analyst forecast accuracy 
or forecast dispersion, while Tan et al. (2011) fail to find an increase in forecast accuracy 
for local analysts. In light of the mixed results of research on the effects of IFRS adoption 
on analyst forecasts in particular, examining its effects on stock recommendations is 
especially important in order to better assess the impact of the IFRS switch on analyst 
research.  
Examining the impact of IFRS on the informativeness of analyst recommendation 
revisions is important for a number of other reasons as well. First, stock 
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recommendations are one of the most important components of financial analyst research 
output eliciting strong market reactions around their release, (Stickel, 1995; Womack, 
1996; Barber, Lehavy, McNichols, Trueman, 2001, 2003, 2006; Jegadeesh and Kim, 
2006; Chen and Cheng, 2005, Howe, Unlu, and Yan, 2009), even in the period after 
twelve of the largest investment banks settled with the SEC on grounds of biased analyst 
research (Kadan, Madureira, Wand and Zach, 2009).   
Second, empirical evidence also suggests that the information content of stock 
recommendations and their revisions is not entirely subsumed by information contained 
in any other type of analyst research output. For example, Francis and Soffer (1997) 
provide evidence that after controlling for earnings forecast revisions, the level and the 
revision in stock recommendations explain a significant part of the variation in abnormal 
returns, indicating their incremental explanatory power beyond the information conveyed 
by earnings forecasts. Asquith, Mikhail and Au, (2005) extend the results of Francis and 
Soffer (1997) and find that recommendation upgrades (downgrades) are associated with 
positive (negative) market reactions after controlling for the information content of 
earnings forecasts and price targets. Similarly, Brav and Lehavy (2003) show that 
recommendations and earnings forecast revisions are informative in the presence of target 
prices. In addition, literature suggests that the informativeness of analyst forecasts differs 
from that of stock recommendations as individual investors seem to have difficulty 
comprehending the meaning of the former but literally rely on analyst stock 
recommendations without accounting for possible biases (Malmendier and Shanthikumar, 
2007; Mikhail, Walther and Willis, 2007). Overall, extant evidence suggests that the 
information content of analyst stock recommendations is, at least to some extent, unique, 
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further highlighting the need to examine the impact of IFRS on analyst stock 
recommendations. 
Third, looking at recommendations enables us to examine how the effects of IFRS 
adoption on analyst research quality affect investor reliance on this research. This is an 
important question to answer since analysts are important market intermediaries whose 
main goal is to disseminate information to the market. Even though a number of studies 
examine whether the IFRS switch affects analyst forecast properties, (e.g., Byard et al., 
2011; Preiato et al., 2015), how the market will react to the information embedded in 
analyst reports cannot be discerned from the results of this research. Even under the 
assumption that IFRS adoption is associated with increased forecast accuracy, (see for 
example, Byard et al., 2011; Ashbaugh and Pincus, 2001), differences in the information 
content of forecasts and recommendations suggest that it is not clear whether this 
increased forecast accuracy will also translate to increased recommendation 
informativeness. This is also the case since IFRS adoption may be associated with 
increased forecast accuracy not so much because IFRS convey more information about 
the firm but because IFRS earnings are less volatile and hence more predictable. Tan et al. 
(2011), also acknowledge this possibility: “Opponents also criticize IFRS for allowing 
too much judgment in fair value measurements… If this subjectivity results in increased 
earnings smoothing, then analyst following could decline due to the diminished 
usefulness of accounting data, but forecast accuracy could improve” (p.1309). Thus, even 
though IFRS adoption has been associated with increased forecast accuracy whether it 
also increased the informativeness of analyst research is still an open research question. A 
complete assessment of the effects of IFRS adoption on financial analyst research can’t 
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therefore be achieved without examining how investors perceive and react to analyst 
reports.  
Finally, examining the informativeness of analyst stock recommendation revisions also 
allows to condition the analysis on the direction of the information revealed, i.e., whether 
the revision conveys good vs. bad news. Related literature documents that the 
informativeness of downgrades is generally greater than that of upgrades (Womack, 1996; 
Kadan et al., 2009), offering two broad explanations for this result. First, a number of 
incentives motivate firms to avoid or delay the disclosure of bad news. Kothari et al. 
(2009), for example, document higher price reactions for bad news disclosures indicating 
that management successfully withholds bad news until it is inevitably released. The 
survey results of Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005), support this conclusion, by 
providing evidence that managers delay bad news in the hope they may never have to 
disclose it if firm performance improves in the future. Second, analysts face incentives to 
issue optimistic recommendations for the firms they follow due to career concerns, the 
desire to increase their employers' revenue from trading commissions or investment 
banking deals (e.g. Dugar and Nathan 1995, Hong and Kubik 2003, Brown et al., 2015), 
and to secure access to the management of the firm (Chen and Matsumoto, 2006), 
resulting in weaker market reactions to upgrades than downgrades (Kadan et al., 2010). 
Together, extant evidence suggests that the information content of analyst 
recommendations is related to their favorableness and hence examining the impact of 
IFRS on the informativeness of analyst research cannot be fully assessed unless the 
analysis allows for the differential impact of IFRS on upgrades and downgrades.  
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2.2 Hypotheses Development 
The above discussion highlights the importance of financial analysts as the main source 
of information for investors, a result that is strongly supported by anecdotal evidence as 
well. According to the SEC, analysts promote “the efficiency of our markets by ferreting 
out facts and offering valuable insights on companies and industry trends.” (Securities 
and Exchange Commission, 2010). 
If the markets rely mostly on analyst reports for information it is not unreasonable to 
expect that the informativeness of analyst reports will be increasing with the reliability 
and quality of firm provided information. The limited literature examining this relation 
offers support for this conjecture. The model in Abarbanell, Lanen and Verrecchia (1995), 
under the assumption that private information acquisition is endogenous, predicts that 
information precision increases forecast informativeness. Frankel, Kothari and Weber 
(2006) find that the informativeness of analyst forecasts is positively related to the 
timeliness of financial information corroborating the results in Francis, Schipper and 
Vincent (2002) who find that more informative earnings announcements add to the 
informativeness of subsequent analyst reports. 
Based on the evidence in the literature suggesting that the adoption of IFRS enhances the 
information environment of the firm, we posit that the mandatory adoption of IFRS will 
render analyst recommendation revisions more reliable, increasing, in turn, their 
informativeness. Hypothesis 1, stated in the alternative form, is therefore the following: 
H1: The informativeness of analyst recommendation revisions is greater in the period 
after the mandatory adoption of IFRS. 
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Yet, the vast majority of previous studies also find that IFRS benefits are more 
pronounced, if not confined, in countries with strong legal or accounting enforcement. 
These results are consistent with the conjecture that the implementation of accounting 
standards is affected by the country’s institutional environment. Daske et al. (2008), for 
example, find that IFRS adoption is related to increased market liquidity and firm values 
and decreased costs of capital, but these results hold only for firms in countries with 
strong legal enforcement. Similarly, Li (2010) finds a significant reduction in the firms’ 
cost of equity capital, while Byard et al. (2011) find that forecast accuracy is increased 
after the mandatory IFRS adoption, but both results hold only for firms in strong legal 
enforcement environments. A number of other papers document that the benefits of IFRS 
adoption apply to firms with low enforcement but that these benefits are stronger if the 
country enforcement level is high. Beuselinck, Joos, Khurana, and Van der Meulen (2010) 
find that the increase in stock price informativeness following IFRS adoption is stronger 
in countries with strong legal enforcement while Landsman et al. (2012) document that 
IFRS adoption increases the information content of earnings announcements, but that this 
effect is stronger in the presence of strong enforcement. Similarly, André, Filip, and 
Paugam (2015), find that in countries with weak audit and accounting quality the 
introduction of IFRS results in lower conditional conservatism, but that this effect is less 
pronounced in high enforcement countries, consistent with a more appropriate application 
of conditional conservatism principles.
2
 
                                                          
2
 Preiato et al. (2015) also examine whether accounting enforcement is related to lower forecast errors. 
Even though they find little evidence that the mandatory and voluntary use of IFRS is associated with lower 
errors once they control for the degree of enforcement, their models don’t include interactions between the 
enforcement variables and the use of IFRS. Therefore, it is not clear whether such a relation would be 
evident in high enforcement countries.  
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Our second hypothesis is therefore based on the consistent evidence in the literature that 
the reliability of the application of IFRS is related to the country’s enforcement level. If 
the informativeness of analyst research increases with the quality of firm disclosures, the 
informativeness of analyst recommendations in the post-IFRS period will be greater in 
high-enforcement countries. Hypothesis 2, stated in the alternative form, is thus the 
following: 
H2: The informativeness of analyst recommendation revisions is greater in the period 
after the mandatory adoption of IFRS for firms domiciled in high enforcement countries. 
3. Methodology and Data 
One major concern when examining the impact of mandatory IFRS adoption is the 
difficulty in separating the financial effects of IFRS from the effects of other possible 
concurrent market changes that are unrelated to financial reporting. To address this 
concern we employ a control sample that comprises of European firms that had 
voluntarily adopted IFRS prior to the European-wide mandated switch to IFRS (see for 
example, Horton et al., 2013; Byard et al., 2011; Tan et al., 2011; Wang, Young, and 
Zhuan, 2008). Changes in the informativeness of recommendation revisions for voluntary 
adopters around the 2005 mandated IFRS adoption event can still be observed if a) the 
informativeness of analyst recommendation revisions is affected by events unrelated to 
the IFRS mandated switch or b) the mandatory adoption results in a more rigorous 
application of IFRS by voluntary adopters (Christensen et al., 2013; Daske et al., 2008, 
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2013).
3
 As discussed in section 5.5 results are qualitatively unchanged when the control 
sample excludes voluntary adopters from countries with lax enforcement. 
3.1 Research Design 
To examine the effect of the mandatory IFRS adoption on the informativeness of analyst 
stock recommendations revisions, we run model (1) below, which employs a difference-
in-differences approach between mandatory and voluntary IFRS adopters. All analyses 
are performed separately for the sub-samples of recommendation upgrades and 
downgrades (see among others, Barber, Lehavy, and Trueman, 2007; Ivkovic and 
Jegadeesh, 2004; Barber et al., 2006).  
CAR= {POST2005, MAND, POST2005*MAND, FOLL, DISPRESION, AVG_SURPRISE, 
TOPBROKER, EXPERIENCE, REC_CD, SAME_EPS_CH, MOMENTUM, M_B, SIZE, 
Country effects, Industry effects}       (1) 
Following related research, the informativeness of analyst recommendations is captured 
by the market reaction around their release. CAR is cumulative abnormal returns over the 
three day window around the recommendation announcement. Daily abnormal returns are 
adjusted for risk based on the market model estimated using daily returns from 265 to 15 
days before the recommendation announcement. Model errors are clustered by event date 
to mitigate the effects of event overlapping.  
POST2005 is an indicator variable which equals 1 if the recommendation revision is 
issued in the period after the mandatory adoption of IFRS, (post-IFRS period), and zero 
                                                          
3
 The use of voluntary adopters in the control sample has the added advantage that these firms reside in the 
same countries as the treatment firms alleviating concerns that inferences may be affected by the different 
institutional and legal environments the two samples operate in.  In section 5.2 we drop this requirement 
and report results using US firms as the control sample. 
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otherwise. We include recommendations that are issued during the 2005 calendar year in 
the pre-IFRS period as the full impact of IFRS disclosure can only be observed after the 
release of firm annual reports. Moving the cutoff date back to 30 June, 2005 to account 
for changes in disclosure of interim reports does not affect inferences (untabulated). 
MAND is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for mandatory and 0 for voluntary 
adopters. If the change in the recommendation informativeness of mandatory adopters is 
due to other concurrent regulatory or market-wide events, the informativeness of stock 
recommendations for voluntary adopters should be similarly affected. In this case, the 
coefficient on POST2005*MAND should not be significantly different from the 
coefficient on POST2005 which captures the change in the informativeness of 
recommendations for the control sample of voluntary adopters. More importantly, a 
significant coefficient on POST2005*MAND would suggest that the informativeness of 
stock recommendations for mandatory adopters is different between the pre- and post-
IFRS periods.  
The model controls for a number of variables that are expected to affect the 
informativeness of analyst stock recommendation revisions. The first set of variables 
captures the richness of the firm’s information environment. We expect that analyst 
upgrades and downgrades should be more value relevant when the firm’s information 
environment is poor. Following Lang and Lundholm, (1996), who show that analysts 
tend to follow firms with more informative disclosures, we first capture the firm’s 
information environment with analyst following, FOLL. FOLL is measured as the natural 
logarithm of the number of analysts that have issued at least one recommendation up to 
the month prior to the recommendation date. Second, the model also controls for the 
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overall uncertainty in the firm’s information environment, captured by the dispersion in 
analyst earnings forecasts (Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Irani and Karamanou, 2003). 
DISPERSION, is calculated as the standard deviation of all annual earnings forecasts 
issued before the recommendation month. Finally, the model controls for earnings 
forecast error, AVG_SURPRISE, measured as the absolute value of the difference 
between actual earnings and the most recent consensus earnings forecast scaled by the 
absolute value of actual earnings. We posit that analyst forecast errors will be greater 
when the information environment of the firm is poor. Zhang (2006) finds that 
information uncertainty is related to larger forecast errors, while Hope (2003) documents 
that analyst forecast accuracy is positively related to the quality of firm-level disclosures.  
Our second set of variables controls for the characteristics of the analyst issuing the 
recommendation. TOPBROKER is an indicator variable taking the value 1 if the 
recommendation is issued by one of the top 10 brokerage firms based on the rankings of 
the Institutional Investor magazine. Institutional Investor’s “All Europe Research Team” 
rankings are based on surveying the directors of research and heads of investments at 
institutions worldwide evaluating. These professionals evaluate each research team based 
on important attributes, the three most important of which are industry knowledge, 
integrity and local market knowledge. Barber et al. (2006) find that recommendation 
announcement returns are greater for larger brokerage houses while Park and Stice (2000) 
find that superior analyst forecasts have a greater impact on market prices. Similarly, 
Gleason and Lee (2003) find that forecasts by Institutional Investor All-Star analysts 
elicit a stronger immediate price response while Loh and Stulz (2011) find that 
recommendations issued by leader and star analysts are more likely to be influential. We, 
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thus, expect a stronger market reaction for recommendation revisions issued by the top 10 
investment banks. Furthermore, prior literature finds that analysts become better as they 
gain experience. Mikhail et al. (2007), for example, show that analyst forecast accuracy 
increases with experience and that the market places more weight on experienced analyst 
forecasts. We capture the level of the analyst’s experience, EXPERIENCE, by the number 
of years in which the analyst issued at least one earnings forecast for the firm.  
Our third set of variables captures the informativeness of the recommendation itself. First, 
we expect that the level of the recommendation revision, REC_CD, should be related to 
the market’s reaction. We retain the IBES ranking system which is based on 5 distinct 
recommendation categories with 1 denoting strong buys and 5 strong sells and expect that 
for upgrades (downgrades) lower (higher) values of the recommendation rating should 
result in a more positive (negative) market reaction. Second, to control for confounding 
effects related to the informativeness of concurrent earnings forecast announcements the 
model includes an indicator variable, SAME_EPS_CH, that takes the value 1 if the 
recommendation revision is accompanied by an earnings forecast revision that moves in 
the same direction. Francis and Soffer (1997) find that price reactions to recommendation 
announcements are enhanced by same-sign evidence from a forecast revision while 
Kecskés, Michaely, and Womack (2017) find that recommendations accompanied by 
earnings forecasts elicit greater market reactions. We thus expect the coefficient on 
SAME_EPS_CH to be positive for upgrades and negative for downgrades. 
Finally, the model includes a number of variables that are related to market returns. We 
use the market-to-book ratio, M_B, to control for firm growth opportunities and the 
natural logarithm of total assets to control for firm size, SIZE. Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische 
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and Lee, (2004) find that analysts tend to recommend smaller and high growth stocks 
while Loh and Stulz (2011) find that recommendations issued for growth and small firms 
are more influential. Price momentum, MOMENTUM, is calculated as the compounded 
daily market-adjusted return in the period from 90 days to 1 day before the 
recommendation announcement. We use price momentum to control for any other 
information available to the market which can induce analysts to revise their 
recommendations (see for example, Jegadeesh et al., 2004).  
3.2 The effect of accounting enforcement 
To examine whether the informativeness of stock recommendations is affected by the 
country’s level of accounting enforcement, we utilize the enforcement measure 
developed by Brown et al. (2014) which more closely captures the country’s degree of 
compliance with accounting standards as promoted by external audit and independent 
enforcement bodies. For this analysis, we replace country fixed effects in model (1) with 
ACCT_ENF, which takes the value 1 for countries with high accounting enforcement and 
0 otherwise. The cutoff value is based on our sample’s median of the AETOTAL variable 
in Brown et al. (2014). To examine whether the relation between increased disclosure and 
the informativeness of recommendation revisions is affected by enforcement levels, we 
interact ACCT_ENF with POST2005 and, following Landsman et al. (2012), we restrict 
the sample to mandatory adopters. In this model specification, we also control for two 
additional country characteristics. First, the importance of the capital market is captured 
by the ratio of market capitalization as a percentage of GDP, MC_GDP. Second, the 
difference between IFRS and local GAAP, DIFF_ACCT, is a dummy variable that takes 
the value 1 for firms domiciled in countries with difference between IFRS and local 
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GAAP above the sample median, and 0 otherwise.  The country values for this variable 
are based on gaap_diff1 obtained from Bae, Tan and Welker (2008), where higher values 
of gaap_diff1 indicate greater differences.  
3.3 Data 
To construct our sample we obtain all recommendations in the IBES database for the 
period 2003 - 2007 for all European firms.
4
 We eliminate recommendations that are 
issued within seven days before the earnings announcement to ensure that the observed 
market reaction around the recommendation is not related to the forthcoming 
announcement. Following related research, we focus on recommendation changes but we 
also require that for each firm in the sample there is at least one recommendation revision 
in both the pre- and post- IFRS periods. This technique alleviates any concerns that the 
change in sample composition may confound results.
5
 Daily returns to construct CAR and 
MOMENTUM and variables to construct M_B and SIZE and to identify the control 
sample of voluntary adopters are obtained from Datastream. Analyst information to 
compute FOLL, REC_CD, SAME_EPS_CH, DISPERSION, AVG_SURPRISE, and 
EXPERIENCE is obtained from IBES. Data to compute MC_GDP are obtained from The 
World Bank, and data to identify the top 10 investment banks from Institutional 
Investor’s “All-Europe Research Team” for each sample year.  
These data requirements result in a final sample of 9,992 recommendation changes issued 
for a total of 348 firms. Panel A of table 1 shows the distribution of the mandatory and 
                                                          
4
 Since this study examines the informativeness of analyst recommendations around an event, extending the 
period under review does not offer any advantage, while at the same time runs the risk of later events, such 
as the onset of the financial crisis, altering results and affecting inferences.  
5
 In section 5.3 we discuss results when this requirement is dropped.  
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voluntary recommendation samples, separately for upgrades and downgrades, across the 
two sub-periods. From the 5,051 upgrades in the sample 4,130 pertain to mandatory and 
921 to voluntary adopters. Similarly, from the 4,941 downgrades 4,047 relate to 
mandatory and 894 to voluntary adopters. Panel B of the same table shows the 
distribution of the sample across country of origin for both the mandatory and voluntary 
samples. According to the panel the country with the highest representation in the 
mandatory sample is the Netherlands with a representation of 17.08%, followed by 
Sweden (15.51%) and the UK (15.43%). We therefore do not observe a major 
concentration in observations from a specific country for the mandatory sample. In 
contrast, the main voluntary sample comprises mostly of firms from Germany (58.79%), 
and Finland (20.06%).  
4.  Empirical Results 
4.1 Univariate analysis 
Panels A and B of Table 2 present mean and median values of all explanatory variables in 
the pre- and post- IFRS periods, separately for the subsamples of upgrades and 
downgrades. The significance of the difference in means and medians is based on a t-test 
and a Wilcoxon test, respectively. Results in table 2 suggest a number of important 
changes in the information environment and firm characteristics across the two periods 
for the mandatory and voluntary samples. Specifically, for the mandatory sample, results 
indicate that in the post-IFRS period upgraded firms exhibit lower analyst following but 
also lower dispersion and lower forecast error. Similarly, downgraded firms also exhibit a 
decrease in analyst following and analyst forecast error after the mandatory adoption of 
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IFRS. Interestingly, none of these analyst attributes changes significantly in the same 
period for the voluntary sample. These results suggest that the mandatory adoption of 
IFRS has differentially affected the information environment of the mandatory and 
voluntary samples. Results in Table 2 also indicate a number of changes that affect 
mandatory and voluntary adopters in a similar manner.  First, in the post-IFRS period, 
analyst upgrades are more favorable as evidenced by the lower values of REC_CD and 
are preceded by lower price momentum. In addition, when in the post-IFRS period 
analysts upgrade firms they are also more likely to revise their earnings forecasts in the 
same direction. Results also suggest that in the post-IFRS period issuing analysts have 
greater experience but are also less likely to work for top-brokers. Results also indicate 
that in the post-IFRS period, analysts tend to both upgrade and downgrade firms a) from 
countries whose local accounting standards exhibit greater differences from IFRS, and b) 
with more important capital markets. Finally, for both mandatory and voluntary samples, 
analysts are more likely to upgrade firms from weak accounting enforcement 
environments but the opposite is true for downgrades. Correlation analysis, (untabulated), 
corroborates these results. Overall, preliminary univariate analysis findings suggest that 
the information environment of both mandatory and voluntary adopters has been affected 
by the mandatory IFRS switch.   
Table 3 compares the market reaction around recommendation revision announcements 
between the two sub-periods for both the mandatory and voluntary samples. Panel A 
presents results for recommendation upgrades and panel B for downgrades. Results 
suggest that for the mandatory sample an upgrade elicits a mean (median) market 
response of 0.551% (0.35%) in the pre- IFRS period and 1.415% (0.97%) in the post- 
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IFRS period. This is equivalent to an increase in mean (median) CAR of 0.864% (0.63%) 
between the two periods, which is both statistically and economically significant. In 
contrast, recommendation upgrades for the voluntary sample do not exhibit significant 
changes between the two periods. Specifically, the mean (median) market reaction to a 
recommendation upgrade in the pre-IFRS period elicits a market response of 0.91% 
(0.78%) insignificantly changing by 0.04% (-0.01%) in the post-IFRS period. Results 
also suggest that even though analyst upgrades are more informative for the voluntary 
than the mandatory sample in the pre-IFRS period, in the post-IFRS period this difference 
is eroded based on median returns and even reversed based on mean returns. 
The market reaction to downgrades for mandatory adopters follows a similar pattern. 
Specifically, even though a downgrade in the pre- IFRS period elicits a mean (median) 
market reaction of -0.63% (-0.45%), such reaction more than doubles in the post-IFRS 
period to -1.52% (-1.08%), reflecting a statistically and economically significant 
difference of -0.88% (-0.63%).  In contrast, the mean (median) market reaction to analyst 
downgrades for the voluntary sample does not become more negative in the post-IFRS 
period. Importantly, while in the pre-IFRS period the mean (median) reaction to 
downgrades for the voluntary sample is significantly more negative than that of the 
mandatory sample this difference disappears in the post-IFRS period.  
Correlation analysis corroborates the above findings. Specifically, untabulated results 
suggest that for upgrades (downgrades) the correlation between CAR and POST2005 is 
strongly positive (negative), consistent with recommendation revisions exhibiting greater 
information content for mandatory adopters in the post-IFRS period. Interestingly, neither 
of these correlations is significant for the voluntary sample. Taken together, the results of 
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the univariate analysis are consistent with an increase in the informativeness of both 
upgrades and downgrades for mandatory IFRS adopters. Multivariate regression results 
which control for differences in firm and analyst characteristics across the two samples 
are presented in the next section.  
4.2 Regression results 
Panel A of Table 4 presents the results of equation (1) for recommendation upgrades and 
panel B for downgrades.
6
 Given that all models contain fixed effects the model intercepts 
cannot be interpreted and therefore are not shown. In both panels, the first model includes 
industry and country fixed effects whereas in the second model fixed country effects are 
dropped and replaced by country variables. To eliminate the effects of event overlapping, 
model residuals are clustered by the date of the recommendation revision release. In both  
models of panel A the coefficient on the interaction between the POST2005 and MAND is 
positive and statistically significant, suggesting that in the post-IFRS period analyst 
upgrades for mandatory adopters elicit a more positive market reaction compared to the 
pre-IFRS period. This increase in CAR is economically significant as well, approaching 
0.9% in both models. In addition, the coefficient on MAND suggests that in the pre-IFRS 
period upgrades for mandatory adopters elicit a market reaction of 0.37% (p-value=0.09) 
and 0.42% (p-value=0.03) lower than that of voluntary adopters. Interestingly, none of 
the models of panel A suggests a similar increase in CAR for the control sample as 
evidenced by the insignificant coefficient on POST2005.  
                                                          
6
 Results are presented after the elimination of outliers at 1% based on the studentized residual.   
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Similar to the findings for the upgraded sample, results for recommendation downgrades 
suggest a more negative market reaction in the post-IFRS period for mandatory adopters. 
Specifically, in both models of panel B, the coefficients on the interaction between 
POST2005 and MAND are negative and strongly significant with values more negative 
than -1.2%. The positive and significant coefficient on MAND suggests that in the pre-
IFRS period downgrades for mandatory adopters are less informative than those issued 
for the voluntary sample, while the insignificant coefficients on POST2005 suggest that 
the informativeness of analyst downgrades for firms that had already adopted IFRS 
voluntarily does not exhibit a significant change.    
The results on the control variables corroborate those of the univariate analysis to a great 
extent. Specifically, results suggest that a rich information environment, as captured by 
analyst following, decreases the informativeness of upgrades. In addition, upgrades 
issued by more experienced analysts or analysts at top investment banks are deemed 
more reliable by the market since they elicit a greater market reaction. In addition, the 
magnitude of the news also affects the informativeness of upgrades. We find that 
upgrades to lower, (i.e., more favorable), rankings and upgrades that are accompanied by 
a consistent revision in earnings forecasts are more informative. We also find that 
recommendation upgrades are more informative for high growth firms as reflected by the 
positive and significant coefficient on M_B and for firms with lower price momentum. 
Finally, results in model 2 also suggest that the market reaction to upgrades is greater for 
firms in countries with stronger accounting enforcement. Overall, we interpret these 
results as indicating that recommendation upgrades are more informative when the 
information they convey is less anticipated and when they are deemed more reliable. 
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These results are broadly consistent with the results in Loh and Stulz (2011) who find 
that recommendation changes are more influential when they are issued for small firms, 
firms with lower Book-to-Market ratios, and lower analyst activity. They also find that 
recommendations issued by leader analysts and which are accompanied by earnings 
forecasts are also more informative.  
Turning to panel B we find that analyst experience and the contemporaneous release of a 
negative forecast revision are associated with greater informativeness for analyst 
downgrades as well. In addition, results suggest that the informativeness of downgrades 
decreases with MOMENTUM, M_B, and SIZE. The first model of panel B also suggests 
that the informativeness of downgrades increases with analyst following but this result is 
not obtained in model (2). We posit that in the downgraded sample SIZE captures most of 
the information effect reflected in analyst following, as evidenced by the high correlation 
between the two variables (ρ=0,77). This result is consistent with the evidence in Barber 
et al. (2001), Stickel (1995), Womack (1996), and Loh and Stulz (2011), who find that 
the market reaction to recommendations is significantly stronger for smaller firms. The 
positive relation of MOMENTUM with CAR suggests that downgrades are deemed more 
informative when they reaffirm poor return performance. Finally, and similarly to the 
upgraded sample, downgrades are more informative when issued for firms in high 
enforcement environments.  
In panel C we allow the relations between CAR and the control variables to differ 
between the mandatory and voluntary sample by presenting separate regressions for the 
two groups. Results corroborate the main findings for both the upgraded and downgraded 
sample. In particular, for the mandatory sample the coefficient on POST2005 is 
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significantly positive (negative) for analyst upgrades (downgrades), suggesting an 
increase in the informativeness of analyst recommendation revisions after the mandatory 
IFRS adoption. Interestingly, we do not find any significant change in the 
informativeness of analyst recommendation revisions for the voluntary sample. In 
addition, the difference in the coefficients on POST2005 between the mandatory and 
voluntary samples is significantly more positive (negative) for analyst upgrades 
(downgrades). Together the results provide consistent and strong evidence that analyst 
recommendation changes are more informative for mandatory adopters in the post-IFRS 
period.  
We next examine whether the country level of accounting enforcement affects the 
association between the IFRS mandatory adoption and the documented increase in the 
informativeness of analyst recommendation revisions. Following Landsman et al. (2012) 
we focus our attention on the mandatory sample and interact POST2005 with ACCT_ENF. 
Model 1 (model 2) of Table 5 presents findings for recommendation upgrades 
(downgrades). First, and consistent with prior research, results indicate that upgrades are 
more informative in the post-IFRS period but only if they are issued for firms domiciled 
in countries with high accounting enforcement, as suggested by the positive and 
significant coefficient on the interaction of POST2005 with ACCT_ENF and the 
insignificant coefficient on POST2005. With respect to downgrades, the negative and 
significant coefficient on POST2005 suggests that downgrades are more informative in 
the post-IFRS period for firms in low accounting enforcement environments. The 
negative and significant coefficient on the interaction between POST2005 and 
ACCT_ENF suggests, however, that the increase in informativeness is even greater for 
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firms domiciled in countries with strong accounting enforcement. We explain these 
results based on research suggesting that managers face incentives to conceal poor 
performance, (Leuz et al., 2003), and hence are reluctant to disclose bad news timely 
(Kothari et al., 2009). This suggests, that in the presence of these incentives, disclosures 
of bad news should be informative even in lax enforcement environments, but good news 
can only be deemed reliable when accounting standards are rigorously enforced.  
The above results corroborate those of Table 4, indicating that the informativeness of 
both upgrades and downgrades increases in the post-IFRS period. Our results also 
suggest that the enforcement effect documented by prior research depends on the 
direction of the sign of the news revealed. This is an important result since the majority 
of related research suggests that the IFRS adoption benefit is confined mostly in high 
enforcement countries. Our evidence, however, indicates that in the presence of negative 
news accounting standards per se can increase the quality of accounting disclosures. 
Charitou, Karamanou, and Lambertides (2015) find that IFRS adoption induces firms to 
reveal their bad news that were able to conceal under local GAAP and that this effect is 
present even in low enforcement environments. We extend their results by showing that 
the negative information revealed is informative to the market, at least as reflected in 
unfavorable analyst recommendation revisions.   
5. Sensitivity analyses 
5.1 Recommendation revision informativeness around earnings announcements 
If the increased informativeness of analyst stock recommendations is indeed related to the 
underlying increase in firm disclosures, the reaction to analyst recommendation revisions 
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should be more pronounced in the period immediately following earnings announcements. 
In Table 6 we examine this conjecture by comparing the informativeness of 
recommendations issued within 30 calendar days after the earnings announcement to 
those issued in the rest of the sample period. For the purposes of this analysis, we also 
add back 354 upgrades and 300 downgrades that were issued 7 days before the earnings 
announcement. Results suggest that both upgrades and downgrades are informative even 
when they are issued away from the earnings announcement but, as expected, those that 
are issued closer to the earnings announcement elicit a more positive and negative market 
reaction to the recommendation revision, respectively. Our results therefore, provide 
consistent evidence that the increased transparency of financial reporting after the IFRS 
mandatory switch increases the informativeness of analyst stock recommendation 
revisions.  
 5.2 Using US firms as control  
Even though our choice of voluntary adopters as control sample is based on the 
expectation that any confounding events would likely affect firms sharing the same 
institutional and legal environments in a similar way, we acknowledge that the two 
samples may differ in important aspects that are difficult to identify and hence to control 
for. Given that the reliability of inferences is based on the appropriateness of the 
benchmarking sample we extend the analysis by using US based firms as an alternative 
control sample. To construct the US control sample we match our European mandatory 
adopters to US firms based on industry, size and market to book multiples.
7
 Similar to the 
                                                          
7
 The control sample consists of all US firms with SIZE and M_B values within 10% of the respective 
values of each treatment firm.  
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main analysis, POST2005 takes the value 1 for recommendation changes announcements 
issued after 2005, and 0 otherwise. The variable EU takes the value 1 if the 
recommendation revision is issued for a European firm that mandatorily adopted IFRS, 
and 0 if the recommendation is issued for a US firm in the control sample. 
Table 7 presents results. In general, our findings are in agreement with those of the main 
analysis presented in Table 4 and suggest that the informativeness of both upgrades and 
downgrades is higher for mandatory adopters in the post-IFRS period. More importantly, 
the analysis fails to document a similar increase in the informativeness of 
recommendation changes for the matching US firms, alleviating concerns that results are 
driven by other confounding events.   
5.3 Other analyses 
In order to further test the robustness of our results, we run a number of additional tests 
(not tabulated). First, we examine whether the informativeness of analyst 
recommendation revisions changes within the pre- or post-IFRS periods. If our results are 
not affected by confounding events or model specification issues and are indeed 
associated with the adoption of IFRS we shouldn’t find changes in the informativeness of 
stock recommendations within either of the two sub-periods. Specifically, for the pre 
(post) period we examine whether notable changes in CAR can be observed around the 
year 2003 (2006).  Results indicate that there are no significant differences in the market 
reaction around these two alternative cutoff dates.  
In the second test we replace the US control sample by the 3-day return of the US value 
weighted market index for each recommendation date in the treatment sample. This 
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method does not rely on any matching procedure to identify suitable US firms and hence 
does not condition inferences on the matching criteria imposed. We continue to find that 
in the post-IFRS period the informativeness of upgrades and downgrades is enhanced 
even when accounting for possible unobserved events that are captured by the return of 
the US market. 
In addition, to examine whether the mandatory IFRS adoption has both direct and indirect 
effects on the informativeness of recommendation revisions we use a path analysis design 
similar to that used in Landsman et al. (2012). Specifically, we examine whether analyst 
following and recommendation lag are mechanisms through which the mandatory IFRS 
adoption increases the informativeness of analysts’ revisions. Using a SEM model 
approach, the equations include a regression of the outcome variable (absolute 3-day 
CAR for mandatory adopters) on the mediating variables and all control variables, and 
regressions of each mediating variable on the source variable. In both cases, we continue 
to find significant direct effects but results do not provide evidence of any significant 
indirect effects.  
Finally, we also find that our results are not sensitive to: (a) using an alternative measure 
of country legal enforcement based on Kaufmann et al. (2007), (b) excluding UK firms, 
(c) excluding from the control sample voluntary adopters from low enforcement countries,  
(d) using two-day window return for measuring the market’s reaction, and (e) dropping 
the requirement that for a given firm to be included in the sample there has to be at least 
one recommendation revision in both the pre- and post-IFRS periods. In short, this array 
of additional tests provides reasonable assurance that our results are robust and inferences 
are not affected by confounding events.  
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6. Summary and Conclusions 
This study revisits the role of financial analysts in capital markets by examining whether 
the mandatory switch to IFRS affects the informativeness of their stock recommendation 
revisions. Prior studies document that IFRS adoption has improved analyst forecast 
attributes but such evidence does not necessarily translate into greater informativeness. It 
is possible that this result may be more related to IFRS earnings exhibiting greater 
predictability rather than providing value relevant information. In light of prior research 
that suggests that analysts rely more on the private communication with management 
than the firm’s financial information for their research output, it is not a priori clear 
whether the switch to IFRS will affect the informativeness of recommendation revisions.  
Our results suggest that in the post-IFRS period the informativeness of analyst 
recommendations is enhanced as evidenced by a more positive reaction to analyst 
upgrades and a more negative reaction to downgrades. When we examine the effect of 
accounting enforcement on recommendation informativeness we find that both upgrades 
and downgrades are more informative in the post-IFRS period for high enforcement 
countries but downgrades are even informative if issued for firms in low enforcement 
environments. This is an important result since it suggests that the enforcement effect 
documented by prior research depends on the direction of the news revealed.  Our results 
should be of importance to regulators as their overall assessment on the impact of the 
mandated IFRS switch cannot be complete without examining how it affects the 
informativeness of analyst research.   
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TABLE 1: Sample description 
Panel A presents the sample distribution separately for upgrades and downgrades. The pre- (post-) 
IFRS period relates to recommendations issued in or before (after) 2005. The mandatory sample 
consists of recommendations issued for firms that mandatorily adopted IFRS. The voluntary sample 
consists of recommendations issued for firms that had adopted IFRS before the EU mandated switch 
and are domiciled in countries with high legal enforcement. Panel B presents the country distribution 
for the mandatory sample and the study’s main voluntary sample comprising firms from high 
enforcement. For comparison purposes the last two columns show the voluntary adopters from low 
enforcement countries that are only used in sensitivity tests.   
 
Panel A: Sample distribution of upgrades and downgrades   
 
 All upgrades Mandatory Sample Voluntary Sample 
    
Pre-IFRS 2652 2251 401 
 52.50% 54.50% 43.54% 
    
Post-IFRS 2399 1879 520 
 47.50% 45.50% 56.46% 
Total upgrades 5051 4130 921 
 
 
 
 All Downgrades Mandatory Sample Voluntary Sample 
    
Pre-IFRS 2756 2371 385 
 55.78% 58.59% 43.06% 
    
Post-IFRS 2185 1676 509 
 44.22% 41.41% 56.94% 
Total downgrades 4941 4047 894 
    
Total number of 
Recommendations 9992 8177 1815 
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Panel B:  Country Distribution 
 All recommendations Mandatory Sample Voluntary Sample 
Country Frequency % Frequency % Frequency % 
Belgium 323 3.23% 184 2.25% 139 7.66% 
Germany 1938 19.40% 871 10.65% 1067 58.79% 
Denmark 617 6.17% 592 7.24% 25 1.38% 
Spain 193 1.93% 193 2.36% 0 0.00% 
Finland 1514 15.15% 1150 14.06% 364 20.06% 
France 1119 11.20% 1099 13.44% 20 1.10% 
UK 1262 12.63% 1262 15.43% 0 0.00% 
Hungary 6 0.06% 0 0.00% 6 0.33% 
Ireland 1 0.01% 1 0.01% 0 0.00% 
Italy 43 0.43% 43 0.53% 0 0.00% 
The Netherlands 1404 14.05% 1397 17.08% 7 0.39% 
Poland 62 0.62% 36 0.44% 26 1.43% 
Portugal 132 1.32% 81 0.99% 51 2.81% 
Sweden 1378 13.79% 1268 15.51% 110 6.06% 
Total  9992 100.00% 8177 100.00% 1815 100.00% 
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TABLE 2: Descriptive Statistics 
The table presents mean and median values of all independent variables across the full sample (n=9992). 
The first (second) line of each variable denotes the mandatory (voluntary) firms. The paired t-test and 
Wilcoxon rank sum tests are used to examine the statistical significance of the mean and median values, 
respectively. FOLL is the natural logarithm of analyst following. DISPERSION is calculated as the 
standard deviation of all annual earnings forecasts issued before the recommendation month. 
AVG_SURPRISE is the absolute value of the percentage difference between actual earnings and the most 
recent consensus earnings forecast. TOPBROKER takes the value 1 if the recommendation is issued by one 
of the top 10 brokerage firms, and 0 otherwise. EXPERIENCE is measured as the number of years in 
which the analyst issuing the recommendation revision has issued at least one earnings forecast for the 
firm. REC_CD is the IBES level of recommendation ranging from 1 to 5 with 1 indicating a strong buy 
and 5 a strong sell. SAME_EPS_CH takes the value 1 if the recommendation announcement is made on the 
same day with an EPS forecast revision in the same direction. MOMENTUM is the compounded market 
adjusted return in a 90-day period before the recommendation. M_B is the ratio of market value to book 
value of equity. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. ACCT_ENF takes the value of 1 for countries 
with high auditing and accounting setting enforcement and 0 otherwise, based on the sample median 
values of the measure in Brown et al. (2014). DIFF_ACCT takes the value 1 for firms domiciled in 
countries whose local GAAP is substantially different from IFRS, and 0 otherwise based on the sample 
median values from Bae et al. (2008). MC_GDP is the country’s market capitalization deflated by GDP. 
Variable values on the first (second) line are based on the mandatory (voluntary) sample. Significance 
levels of 1%, 5% and 10% are indicated by 
a
, 
b
 and 
c
 respectively. 
 
 Upgrades 
 Mean Median 
 
Pre-IFRS 
 (1) 
Post-IFRS 
 (2) 
Difference 
(2) – (1) 
Pre-IFRS 
 (1) 
Post-IFRS 
 (2) 
Difference  
(2) – (1) 
FOLL 2.6436 2.5789 -0.0647
a
 2.7081 2.6391 -0.0690
a
 
 2.6959 2.5728 -0.1231 3.2189 2.9957 -0.2232
a
 
DISPERSION 1.3344 0.9617 -0.3727
b
 0.2000 0.2200 0.0200
a
 
 0.2231 0.9875 0.7644
a
 0.1600 0.2200 0.0600
a
 
AVG_SURPRISE 0.5982 0.1894 -0.4088
a
 0.1168 0.0609 -0.0559
a
 
 0.2837 0.2033 -0.0804 0.0812 0.0820 0.0008 
TOPBROKER 0.2621 0.2390 -0.0231
c
 0 0 0
c
 
 0.2319 0.1788 -0.0531
b
 0 0 0
b
 
EXPERIENCE 2.9738 3.6557 0.6819
a
 3 3 0
a
 
 3.5611 4.3173 0.7562
a
 3 4 1
a
 
REC_CD 1.9698 1.8930 -0.0768
a
 2 2 0
a
 
 1.9227 1.8346 -0.0881
c
 2 2 0
b
 
SAME_EPS_CH 0.3607 0.4045 0.0438
a
 0 0 0
a
 
 0.3067 0.3423 0.0356 0 0 0 
MOMENTUM 0.0064 -0.0171 -0.0235
a
 0.0020 -0.0105 -0.0125
a
 
 -0.0169 -0.0512 -0.0343
a
 -0.0047 -0.0298 -0.0251
a
 
M_B 3.1732 3.6187 0.4455
a
 2.2403 2.3830 0.1427
a
 
 2.4421 2.6046 0.1625
c
 2.1448 2.3166 0.1718 
SIZE 8.0060 7.9854 -0.0206 7.9443 7.8801 -0.0642 
 8.6822 8.6276 -0.0546 8.6570 8.9780 0.3210 
ACCT_ENF 0.6219 0.4231 -0.1988
a
 1 1 0
a
 
 0.8105 0.6750 -0.1355
a
 1 1 0 
DIFF_ACCT 0.5087 0.5375 0.0288
c
 1 1 0
c
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 0.9352 0.9327 -0.0025 1 1 0 
MC_GDP 88.8307 117.6057 28.7750
a
 90.7739 122.2220 31.4481
a
 
 59.6381 84.9939 25.3558
a
 43.7977 63.2446 19.4469
a
 
       
 
 Downgrades 
 Mean Median 
 
Pre-IFRS 
 (1) 
Post-IFRS 
 (2) 
Difference 
(2) – (1) 
Pre-IFRS 
 (1) 
Post-IFRS 
 (2) 
Difference  
(2) – (1) 
FOLL 2.6122 2.5712 -0.0410
c
 2.7081 2.6391 -0.0690
b
 
 2.6481 2.6435 -0.0046 3.1781 2.9957 -0.1824 
DISPERSION 1.1595 1.0234 -0.1361 0.1800 0.2300 0.0500
a
 
 0.2506 0.9365 0.6859
a
 0.1700 0.2100 0.0400
b
 
AVG_SURPRISE 0.7771 0.2204 -0.5567
a
 0.1178 0.0666 -0.0512
a
 
 0.3297 0.2182 -0.1115 0.0864 0.0879 0.0015 
TOPBROKER 0.2644 0.2208 -0.0436
a
 0 0 0
a
 
 0.2286 0.1788 -0.0498
c
 0 0 0
c
 
EXPERIENCE 2.9561 3.6211 0.6650
a
 3 3 0
a
 
 3.4234 4.2692 0.8458
a
 3 4 1
a
 
REC_CD 3.4369 3.3634 -0.0735
a
 3 3 0
a
 
 3.3818 3.4361 0.0543 3 3 0 
SAME_EPS_CH 0.3496 0.2942 -0.0554
a
 0 0 0
a
 
 0.3506 0.2947 -0.0559
c
 0 0 0
c
 
MOMENTUM 0.0092 0.0134 0.0042 0.0088 0.0105 0.0017 
 -0.0137 -0.0151 -0.0288 0 -0.0026 -0.0026 
M_B 3.0967 3.5102 0.4135
a
 2.2403 2.4542 0.2139
a
 
 2.3816 2.5728 0.1912
b
 2.1448 2.2088 0.0640 
SIZE 7.8712 7.9210 0.0498 7.8646 7.8047 -0.0599 
 8.4898 8.7199 0.2301
c
 8.3956 8.9780 0.5824
b
 
ACCT_ENF 0.4585 0.7333 0.2748
a
 0 1 1
a
 
 0.1610 0.3399 0.1789
a
 0 0 0
a
 
DIFF_ACCT 0.5032 0.5376 0.0344
b
 1 1 0
b
 
 0.9377 0.9371 -0.0006 1 1 0 
MC_GDP 90.1965 118.2276 28.0311
a
 90.7739 124.8385 34.0646
a
 
 58.9990 88.3650 29.3660
a
 43.7977 63.2446 19.4469
a
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Table 3: Mean and Median Differences in Market Reaction 
This table presents the mean and median differences in CAR between the mandatory and voluntary samples and 
between the pre- and post-IFRS periods. The number of observations for each sub-sample is shown in table 1.  
CAR is cumulative risk adjusted abnormal returns over the three day window around the recommendation 
announcement. The pre- (post-) IFRS period relates to recommendations issued in or before (after) 2005. 
Significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% are indicated by 
a
, 
b
 and 
c
 respectively. 
 
 Upgrades 
 
Pre-IFRS 
(1)  
Post-IFRS 
(2)  
Difference between  
Pre and Post 
(2) – (1)  
Mandatory Mean 0.00551
a
  0.01415
a
  0.00864
a
  
Voluntary Mean 0.00913
a
  0.00950
a
  0.00037  
Voluntary-Mandatory  0.00362
b
  -0.00465
b
    
       
Mandatory Median 0.00346
a
  0.00973
a
  0.00627
a
  
Voluntary Median 0.00783
a
  0.00678
a
  -0.00105  
Voluntary-Mandatory 0.00437
a
  -0.00295    
       
 Downgrades 
 
Pre-IFRS 
(1)  
Post-IFRS 
(2)  
Difference between  
Pre and Post 
(2) – (1)  
Mandatory Mean -0.00630
a
  -0.01518
a
  -0.00888
a
  
Voluntary Mean -0.01525
a
  -0.01154
a
  0.00371  
Voluntary-Mandatory -0.00895
a
  0.00364    
       
Mandatory Median -0.00446
a
  -0.01077
a
  -0.00631
a
  
Voluntary Median -0.01214
a
  -0.00829
a
  0.00385
c
  
Voluntary-Mandatory -0.00768
a
  0.00248    
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Table 4: The impact of increased disclosure on the informativeness of recommendation 
changes 
The dependent variable CAR is cumulative risk adjusted abnormal returns over the three day window around 
the recommendation announcement. POST2005 takes the value 1 when the recommendation announcement is 
issued in the post-IFRS period and 0 otherwise. MAND takes the value 1 when the recommendation is issued 
for mandatory adopters and 0 for the control sample of voluntary adopters. FOLL is the natural logarithm 
of analyst following. DISPERSION is calculated as the standard deviation of all annual earnings forecasts 
issued before the recommendation month. AVG_SURPRISE is the absolute value of the percentage 
difference between actual earnings and the most recent consensus earnings forecast. TOPBROKER takes 
the value 1 if the recommendation is issued by one of the top 10 brokerage firms, and 0 otherwise. 
EXPERIENCE is measured as the number of years in which the analyst issuing the recommendation 
revision has issued at least one earnings forecast for the firm. REC_CD is the IBES level of 
recommendation ranging from 1 to 5 with 1 indicating a strong buy and 5 a strong sell. SAME_EPS_CH 
takes the value 1 if the recommendation announcement is made on the same day with an EPS forecast 
revision in the same direction. MOMENTUM is the compounded market adjusted return in a 90-day period 
before the recommendation. M_B is the ratio of market value to book value of equity. SIZE is the natural 
logarithm of total assets. ACCT_ENF takes the value of 1 for countries with high auditing and accounting 
setting enforcement and 0 otherwise, based on the sample median values of the measure in Brown et al. 
(2014). DIFF_ACCT takes the value 1 for firms domiciled in countries whose local GAAP is substantially 
different from IFRS, and 0 otherwise based on the sample median values from Bae et al. (2008). MC_GDP 
is the country’s market capitalization deflated by GDP. Errors are clustered by recommendation date. 
Second row shows p-values. Significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% are indicated by 
a
, 
b
 and 
c
 respectively. 
 
Panel A: Upgrades 
  (1) (2) 
POST2005 -0.00090 -0.00155 
 0.73 0.57 
MAND -0.00365
c
 -0.00418
b
 
 0.09 0.03 
POST2005*MAND 0.00839
a
 0.00860
a
 
 0.01 0.01 
FOLL -0.00292
b
 -0.00224
a
 
 0.02 0.01 
DISPERSION 0.00013 0.00012 
 0.14 0.14 
AVG_SURPRISE -0.00002 -0.00001 
 0.81 0.92 
TOPBROKER 0.00651
a
 0.00625
a
 
 0.01 0.01 
EXPERIENCE 0.00050
c
 0.00051
c
 
 0.06 0.06 
REC_CD -0.00178
a
 -0.00183
a
 
 0.01 0.01 
SAME_EPS_CH 0.00565
a
 0.00554
a
 
 0.01 0.01 
MOMENTUM -0.00799
b
 -0.00858
b
 
 0.05 0.03 
M_B 0.00064
a
 0.00061
a
 
 0.01 0.01 
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SIZE -0.00015 0.00002 
 0.76 0.96 
ACCT_ENF  0.00369
b
 
  0.02 
DIFF_ACCT  0.00211 
  0.26 
MC_GDP  0.00003 
  0.34 
   
Country Effects YES NO 
Industry effects YES YES 
   
N 5051 5051 
Adj. R-Sq 0.1012 0.0987 
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Panel B: Downgrades 
 (1) (2) 
POST2005 0.00277 0.00292 
 0.33 0.33 
MAND 0.00990
a
 0.01008
a
 
 0.01 0.01 
POST2005*MAND -0.01283
a
 -0.01255
a
 
 0.01 0.01 
FOLL -0.00336
a
 -0.00115 
 0.01 0.20 
DISPERSION 0.00006 0.00013 
 0.56 0.16 
AVG_SURPRISE -0.00021 -0.00019 
 0.18 0.21 
TOPBROKER -0.00230
c
 -0.00201 
 0.10 0.14 
EXPERIENCE -0.00072
a
 -0.00059
b
 
 0.01 0.04 
REC_CD -0.00055 -0.00083 
 0.40 0.20 
SAME_EPS_CH -0.00859
a
 -0.00866
a
 
 0.01 0.01 
MOMENTUM 0.01368
a
 0.01478
a
 
 0.01 0.01 
M_B 0.00120
a
 0.00100
a
 
 0.01 0.01 
SIZE 0.00322
a
 0.00210
a
 
 0.01 0.01 
ACCT_ENF  -0.00536
a
 
  0.01 
DIFF_ACCT  0.00170 
  0.37 
MC_GDP  0.00004 
  0.19 
   
Country Effects YES NO 
Industry effects YES YES 
   
N 4941 4941 
Adj. R-Sq 0.1180 0.0508 
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Panel C: Separate regressions       
 Upgrades Downgrades 
  
 Mandatory Voluntary 
 
Difference Mandatory Voluntary 
 
Difference 
POST2005 0.00727
a
 -0.00330 0.01057
a
 -0.01007
a
 0.00304 -0.01311
a
 
 0.01 0.21 0.01 0.01 0.31 0.01 
FOLL -0.00408
a
 -0.01035
c
 0.00627 -0.00545
a
 0.00482 -0.01027 
 0.01 0.06 0.28 0.01 0.48 0.14 
DISPERSION 0.00008 0.00601
a
 -0.00593
a
 0.00062 0.00092 -0.00085 
 0.37 0.01 0.01 0.55 0.79 0.81 
AVG_SURPRISE 0.00002 -0.00355
a
 0.00357
a
 -0.00022 -0.00027 0.00005 
 0.79 0.01 0.01 0.15 0.89 0.98 
TOPBROKER 0.00597
a
 0.01014
a
 -0.00417 -0.00131 -0.00585
c
 0.00454 
 0.01 0.01 0.21 0.37 0.09 0.21 
EXPERIENCE 0.00057
c
 0.00065 -0.00008 -0.00079
a
 -0.00055 -0.00025 
 0.06 0.26 0.90 0.01 0.38 0.72 
REC_CD -0.00188
a
 -0.00085 -0.00103 0.00073 -0.00586
a
 0.00659
a
 
 0.01 0.62 0.58 0.30 0.01 0.01 
SAME_EPS_CH 0.00484
a
 0.00946
a
 -0.00462 -0.00886
a
 -0.00718
b
 -0.00168 
 0.01 0.01 0.13 0.01 0.02 0.60 
MOMENTUM -0.01224
a
 0.01234 -0.02458
b
 0.00956
c
 0.03267
a
 -0.02311
c
 
 0.01 0.23 0.03 0.10 0.01 0.07 
M_B 0.00062
a
 0.00182 -0.00120 0.00118
a
 0.00102 0.00017 
 0.01 0.14 0.33 0.01 0.47 0.91 
SIZE 0.00010 0.00146 -0.00136 0.00356
a
 0.00277 0.00079 
 0.86 0.40 0.46 0.01 0.19 0.70 
       
Country Effects YES YES  YES YES  
Industry effects YES YES  YES YES  
       
       
N 4130 921  4047 894  
Adj. R-Sq 0.1076 0.1347  0.1137 0.1748  
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Table 5: The impact of IFRS and enforcement on the informativeness of recommendation 
changes 
The dependent variable CAR is cumulative risk adjusted abnormal returns over the three day window 
around the recommendation announcement. POST2005 takes the value 1 when the recommendation 
announcement is issued in post-IFRS period 0 otherwise. MAND takes the value 1 when the 
recommendation is issued for mandatory adopters and 0 for the control sample of voluntary adopters. 
FOLL is the natural logarithm of analyst following. DISPERSION is calculated as the standard deviation of 
all annual earnings forecasts issued before the recommendation month. AVG_SURPRISE is the absolute 
value of the percentage difference between actual earnings and the most recent consensus earnings forecast. 
TOPBROKER takes the value 1 if the recommendation is issued by one of the top 10 brokerage firms, and 
0 otherwise. EXPERIENCE is measured as the number of years in which the analyst issuing the 
recommendation revision has issued at least one earnings forecast for the firm. REC_CD is the IBES level 
of recommendation ranging from 1 to 5 with 1 indicating a strong buy and 5 a strong sell. SAME_EPS_CH 
takes the value 1 if the recommendation announcement is made on the same day with an EPS forecast 
revision in the same direction. MOMENTUM is the compounded market adjusted return in a 90-day period 
before the recommendation. M_B is the ratio of market value to book value of equity. SIZE is the natural 
logarithm of total assets. ACCT_ENF takes the value of 1 for countries with high auditing and accounting 
setting enforcement and 0 otherwise, based on the sample median values of the measure in Brown et al. 
(2014). DIFF_ACCT takes the value 1 for firms domiciled in countries whose local GAAP is substantially 
different from IFRS, and 0 otherwise based on the sample median values from Bae et al. (2008). MC_GDP 
is the country’s market capitalization deflated by GDP. Errors are clustered by recommendation date. 
Second row shows p-values. Significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% are indicated by 
a
, 
b
 and 
c
 respectively. 
 
  
Upgrades Downgrades 
POST2005 0.00129 -0.00475
b
 
 0.51 0.05 
POST2005* ACCT_ENF 0.01010
a
 -0.00794
a
 
 0.01 0.01 
FOLL -0.00437
a
 -0.00160 
 0.01 0.21 
DISPERSION 0.00004 0.00006 
 0.60 0.56 
AVG_SURPRISE -0.00001 -0.00019 
 0.88 0.21 
TOPBROKER 0.00574
a
 -0.00111 
 0.01 0.45 
EXPERIENCE 0.00054
c
 -0.00068
b
 
 0.07 0.03 
REC_CD -0.00179
a
 0.00046 
 0.01 0.51 
SAME_EPS_CH 0.00469
a
 -0.00893
a
 
 0.01 0.01 
MOMENTUM -0.01266
a
 0.01074
c
 
 0.01 0.07 
M_B 0.00059
a
 0.00092
a
 
 0.01 0.01 
SIZE 0.00038 0.00193
a
 
 0.39 0.01 
ACCT_ENF -0.00235 -0.00278
c
 
 0.15 0.09 
DIFF_ACCT 0.00219 0.00181 
 0.28 0.40 
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MC_GDP 0.00003 0.00006 
 0.39 0.16 
   
Country effects NO NO 
Industry effects YES YES 
   
   
N 4130 4047 
Adj. R-Sq 0.1108 0.1073 
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Table 6: The informativeness of recommendation changes around earnings announcements 
The dependent variable CAR is cumulative risk adjusted abnormal returns over the three day window 
around recommendation announcements issued in a period of 30 days after corporate earnings 
announcements (post-EAD) compared to the period away from earnings announcements (no-EAD). 
POST2005 takes the value 1 when the recommendation announcement is issued in post-IFRS period and 0 
otherwise. MAND takes the value 1 when the recommendation is issued for mandatory adopters and 0 for 
the control sample of voluntary adopters. FOLL is the natural logarithm of analyst following. DISPERSION 
is calculated as the standard deviation of all annual earnings forecasts issued before the recommendation 
month. AVG_SURPRISE is the absolute value of the percentage difference between actual earnings and the 
most recent consensus earnings forecast. TOPBROKER takes the value 1 if the recommendation is issued 
by one of the top 10 brokerage firms, and 0 otherwise. EXPERIENCE is measured as the number of years 
in which the analyst issuing the recommendation revision has issued at least one earnings forecast for the 
firm. REC_CD is the IBES level of recommendation ranging from 1 to 5 with 1 indicating a strong buy and 
5 a strong sell. SAME_EPS_CH takes the value 1 if the recommendation announcement is made on the 
same day with an EPS forecast revision in the same direction. MOMENTUM is the compounded market 
adjusted return in a 90-day period before the recommendation. M_B is the ratio of market value to book 
value of equity. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. Errors are clustered by recommendation date. 
Second row shows p-values. Significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% are indicated by 
a
, 
b
 and 
c
 respectively.  
 Upgrades  Downgrades  
  POST-EAD NO-EAD Difference POST-EAD NO-EAD Difference 
POST2005 -0.00652 0.00097 -0.00749 0.00655 0.00229 0.00426 
 0.23 0.73 0.21 0.12 0.33 0.37 
MAND -0.01042
b
 -0.00112 -0.00929 0.00785
c
 0.00349 0.00435 
 0.05 0.62 0.11 0.09 0.12 0.39 
POST2005*MAND 0.01699
a
 0.00559
c
 0.01140
c
 -0.01967
a
 -0.00969
a
 -0.00998
c
 
 0.01 0.07 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.07 
FOLL -0.00196 -0.00180 -0.00016 -0.00637
c
 -0.00109 -0.00528 
 0.54 0.15 0.96 0.09 0.38 0.18 
DISPERSION -0.00008 0.00016 -0.00024 -0.00026 0.00011 -0.00037 
 0.71 0.12 0.32 0.23 0.29 0.12 
AVG_SURPRISE 0.00020 -0.00007 0.00027 -0.00003 -0.00019 0.00016 
 0.25 0.50 0.18 0.91 0.19 0.56 
TOPBROKER 0.00793
b
 0.00680
a
 0.00113 0.00181 -0.00203 0.00384 
 0.02 0.01 0.76 0.65 0.11 0.35 
EXPERIENCE 0.00113
c
 0.00048
c
 0.00064 -0.00048 -0.00053
c
 0.00004 
 0.08 0.10 0.35 0.45 0.07 0.95 
REC_CD -0.00128 -0.00171
a
 0.00044 0.00009 -0.00099 0.00108 
 0.52 0.01 0.83 0.95 0.14 0.53 
SAME_EPS_CH 0.01151
a
 0.00429
a
 0.00722
b
 -0.01305
a
 -0.00634
a
 -0.00671
b
 
 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.05 
MOMENTUM -0.00824 -0.00629 -0.00194 0.02743
b
 0.00273 0.02470
c
 
 0.39 0.15 0.85 0.05 0.56 0.08 
M_B 0.00073 0.00052
b
 0.00021 0.00127
b
 0.00113
a
 0.00014 
 0.12 0.02 0.67 0.02 0.01 0.81 
SIZE -0.00009 -0.00035 0.00026 0.00421
a
 0.00233
a
 0.00188 
 0.94 0.49 0.86 0.01 0.01 0.25 
       
Country Effects YES YES  YES YES  
Industry effects YES YES  YES YES  
       
N 952 4453  936 4305  
Adj. R-Sq 0.1633 0.0884  0.2090 0.0869  
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Table 7: US control sample  
The dependent variable CAR is cumulative risk adjusted abnormal returns over the three day window 
around the recommendation announcement. POST2005 takes the value 1 when the recommendation 
announcement is issued in post-IFRS period and 0 otherwise. EU takes the value 1 when the 
recommendation is issued for mandatory adopters and 0 for the control sample of US firms. FOLL is the 
natural logarithm of analyst following. DISPERSION is calculated as the standard deviation of all annual 
earnings forecasts issued before the recommendation month. AVG_SURPRISE is the absolute value of the 
percentage difference between actual earnings and the most recent consensus earnings forecast. 
TOPBROKER takes the value 1 if the recommendation is issued by one of the top 10 brokerage firms, and 
0 otherwise. EXPERIENCE is measured as the number of years in which the analyst issuing the 
recommendation revision has issued at least one earnings forecast for the firm. REC_CD is the IBES level 
of recommendation ranging from 1 to 5 with 1 indicating a strong buy and 5 a strong sell. SAME_EPS_CH 
takes the value 1 if the recommendation announcement is made on the same day with an EPS forecast 
revision in the same direction. MOMENTUM is the compounded market adjusted return in a 90-day period 
before the recommendation. M_B is the ratio of market value to book value of equity. SIZE is the natural 
logarithm of total assets. Errors are clustered by recommendation date. Second row shows p-values. 
Significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% are indicated by 
a
, 
b
 and 
c
 respectively. 
 
  Upgrades Downgrades 
POST2005 0.00191 0.00078 
 0.27 0.73 
EU 0.00979
b
 0.02175
c
 
 0.04 0.08 
POST2005*EU 0.00413
c
 -0.01404
a
 
 0.06 0.01 
FOLL 0.00055 -0.00391
b
 
 0.66 0.02 
DISPERSION -0.00016 -0.00009 
 0.40 0.50 
AVG_SURPRISE 0.00023 -0.00015 
 0.33 0.69 
TOPBROKER 0.00584
a
 -0.00081 
 0.01 0.57 
EXPERIENCE 0.00072
a
 -0.00002 
 0.01 0.93 
REC_CD -0.00535
a
 -0.00453
a
 
 0.01 0.01 
SAME_EPS_CH 0.02192
a
 -0.03205
a
 
 0.01 0.01 
MOMENTUM 0.00159 0.03015
a
 
 0.67 0.01 
M_B 0.00069
b
 0.00138
b
 
 0.03 0.02 
SIZE -0.00465
a
 0.00751
a
 
 0.01 0.01 
   
Country Effects YES YES 
Industry effects YES YES 
   
   
N 11757 11387 
Adj. R-Sq 0.0709 0.1374 
 
